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Abstract
Diese Diplomarbeit analysiert den Einfluss von internen Finanzierung auf das 
Investitionsverhalten von Firmen aus zehn Schwellenländern (Hong Kong, 
Indonesien, Indien, Korea, Malaysia, Philippinen, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand und 
die Türkei.). Die Arbeit verwendet ökonometrische Methoden und firmenspezifische 
Daten von der Periode 1985-2004. Drei Institutionelle Faktoren (Rechtskreis, 
Korruptionsniveau und die Eigentümerstruktur) haben einen ökonomisch und 
statistisch signifikanten Einfluss auf das Investitionsverhalten von Firmen.
Abstract
I analyse the impact of three institutional factors (legal origin, percevived corruption 
level and ownership structures) on the cash flow sensitivity of investment in ten 
emerging markets (Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey.). Common Law origin countries and 
countries which reveal a low level of perceived corruption indicate economically and 
statistically lower sensitivities. The impact of ownership is less conclusive, which is 
likely to be a consequence of complex structure.
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1. Introduction
Several studies in the field of corporate finance and industrial economics provide 
empirical evidence on a strong relationship between investment and cash flow. For 
simplicity I will call this relationship as “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity” (I-CFS) 
exactly the same as in some other previous studies (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 
2000; Moyen, 2004; Yurtoglu et. al., 2004; Alti, 2003 etc.). Besides that, some other 
studies have found evidence about the effect of firm’s ownership structure, as well as 
country’s level of corruption and legal origin on the investment activities (La Porta, 
Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1996 (hereafter LSSV); Yurtoglu, 1999; Shin and Park, 
1999, etc). The main subject of this master thesis is to compare the role of ownership 
structures, corruption levels and the legal origin as determinants of investment on the 
information asymmetry-and managerial discretion- levels of ten different emerging 
economies, by using cash flows and Tobin’s q as proxies. 
This country-level research includes the following emerging markets; Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. 
To minimize the country-specific errors, I chose for the estimation only the developing 
capitalist economies which have similarities in the past and during their transition 
stage (the transition process after the war or dependency). However those countries 
are differing in sizes (market capitalization, GDP, population, etc.) and in
governmental structures (laws, regulations etc.). Additionally, all of the companies in 
the sample are listed in stock markets and belong to industrial sector, therefore they 
can be seen as competitors in a growing global market. This leads me to expect that 
they would follow similar routes or decide within the similar range of strategies if they 
were faced with the same external effects (corruption, legal origin, creditor- and 
shareholder- rights, etc.). Apparently, the most important starting point should be to 
determine firm’s investment behaviour and the related theories at micro-level before 
comparing the differing countries in macro-level. I will introduce the cash flows as the 
most solid determinant of investment and then the related theories concerning the 
use of cash flow and its implications on the level of management, shareholders and 
the capital market.   
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Although the sensitivity between cash flow and investment plays an important role in 
the firm’s behaviour, unfortunately there have been little research exploring it.  
Besides, the problem of finding the reliable data on firms still exists, which can be 
seen as a barrier for the consistency of those studies. Some considerable gaps which 
can affect the reliability of information sources for a robust empirical research can be 
summarized as follows:  
1. Complexity or impossibility to enter the information sources of some 
companies.
2. Diversity of governmental activities and social structures between countries.
3. Differences in corruption-level of economies which allows for asymmetrical 
information especially in field of accounting sector.
4. Differences in length and speed of transition process of countries being 
observed. 
5. Varying sample size between countries due to economic structure, size and 
population.
The data which is used in this thesis (unbalanced panel) is taken from the 
Compustat® Global database of Standard & Poors.1 The Analysis includes totally
43038 observations on the listed firms of those already defined developing countries, 
between periods 1985 and 2004. Firms are differentiated by the Three-Digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code table. There exist constitutional differences
between those countries which can be seen as gaps that can affect the consistency 
of this analysis. Section 5 should be helpful to compensate this problem, by giving 
information for each country for a deeper understanding of economic, social and 
political profiles of the objective countries. Then I will introduce some summary 
statistics for the descriptive analysis of the sample. Related theories concerning cash 
flows and Tobin’s q and previous findings are explained in Section 2. The variable 
definitions and statistical model are explained in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. 
Estimation results and conclusions will be discussed and presented in Section 6 and 
7 respectively. Last Section is reserved for the appendix and literature.
                                                
1 www2.standardandpoors.com
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2. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Under Asymmetrical 
Information and Managerial Discretion
2.1 Cash Flow as a Determinant of Investment     
Since a couple of decades there have been several studies which showed the strong 
correlation between investment and cash flow (hereafter CF). However, this evidence 
opened a broad highway of debates after a decade. One of the earliest studies on 
the relationship of cash flow and investment, and an important milestone in this 
research area was introduced by Kuh and Myer (1957) which showed the importance 
of internal funds as a determinant of investment. This is followed later on by the first 
empirical evidence from Fazzari et al. (1988).  In contrast, Modigliani and Miller 
Theory (1958) (MMT) argued that firms’ investment decisions are in a strong relation 
with the neoclassical cost of capital assuming a perfect capital market with no 
asymmetrical information and perfectly substituted financial products for investment 
rather than availability of internal funds (cash flows).2 This approach is of great 
interest to this study, since the cross country levels of information asymmetry 
(hereafter AI) and managerial discretion (hereafter MD) are assumed to be reflected 
by cash flows and Tobin’s q which will be explained later. 
MMT is followed by two major contradicting approaches of firm’s investment 
behaviour, namely the asymmetrical information (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fazzari et 
al. (1988) and the managerial discretion theory (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972), which 
analyze the investment decisions taken by the firm within the framework of the firm-
capital market-link and the conflicting utilities of shareholders and managers as well 
as the firm’s performance.3 Both AI and MD state the existence of the relationship 
between investment and cash flows and hence consider the internal funds as a 
determinant for explaining the investment behaviour.
  
In this cross-country analysis cash flows are predicted to have positive and significant
impact on investments, if the firm has a shortage of external capital for funding 
                                                
2 F. Modigliani and M. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Invetsment”, American Economic Review (June 1958).
See Appendix for Modigliani-Miller Theory and its contribution to my thesis.
3 Also see Gugler and Peev, 2007, ECGI, Finance Working Paper N°. 169/2007, May 2007.
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investments (in the case of AI and MD). Therefore, if 1  denotes the coefficient of 
cash flow in an investment equation, then it must be greater than zero. Note that if 
MMT is valid then 1 = 0 , but none of its assumptions are met in reality. Thus MMT
should give only an intuition that any factor other than cash flow could also effect the 
investment decision of the firm. Those factors (ownership identity, legal origin and 
corruption level) are explained in following sections. 
Why should 1β  be greater than zero? Because, if the extreme assumptions of MMT
do not hold as it is (usually the case) then one must consider an imperfection 
between firm and the capital market (AI) or a conflict between managers and 
shareholders (MD). Hence, it can be a huge mistake to omit cash flows from the 
investment equation. In most empirical cases it is hard to distinguish between AI and 
MD, which is the reason I used Tobin’s q as a second explanatory variable for 
investment, although there are existing debates concerning the reliability of Tobin’s q, 
because it is partly based on the market perceptions. All those findings and the logic 
behind Tobin’s q is explained in the following sections. 
Another field is the firm-valuation in which the cash flows are ultimately important,
where several types of techniques being used such as discounted cash flows in 
which in-and out-flows (negative and positive cash flow streams) of firms are being 
analyzed to make a prognosis about the future value of firms.4 Also the cash flow 
approach could be helpful in analyzing firm’s liquidity level. For example, if a
company takes a risky investment decision and cannot provide sufficient amount of 
positive cash outflow to its financial lenders or cannot cover its cost of capital, than it 
can go bankruptcy although its business actions exhibit positive cash inflows (e.g. 
profits). Therefore, cash flow/total net fixed assets- ratio must be considered firstly 
rather than nominal, total cash flows before financing the investment activities with 
these internal funds. That is why I have scaled all variables of interest with firms’ total
net fixed assets to avoid firm-specific size effects during the analysis.
                                                
4 Firm valuation is of no interest in this study, therefore I prefer to refer only to cash flow ratio. 
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2.2 I-CFS, AI and MD 
AIH investigates I-CFS on the level of financial markets and states that the firm is 
more likely to use its cash flows for investing, if the firm data received by the external 
market (where the sources for investment available) comprise insufficient, wrong or 
non-transparent information which leads to the hardening of external financial 
constraints.5 This theory has some important (only the necessary ones) assumptions 
to be considered before entering the whole content6:
I. Firm has insufficient cash flows to finance an attractive investment with a high     
expected return which is greater than its cost of capital (positive NPV), but 
cannot finance this investment opportunity either because of external 
constraints (e.g. no chance of taking credit) or because its dividend payments 
are nearly zero and therefore not applicable dividend cutting.
II. Managers are perfectly informed about the returns on this investment activity.
III. Managers are perfectly informed about the under-valued (according to market 
perception) existing assets of the firm.
IV. Issuing shares is out of interest because it can harm shareholders during the 
time when share prices are low.
V. Manager’s aim is to maximize only the existing shareholder’s wealth, because 
there is no chance for issuing shares for other investors to finance investment.
                                                
5 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 141-195
Hoshi T., Kashyap A., Scharfstein D., 1991; Corporate Structure liquidity and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. The Quarterly 
Journal of  Economics, 33-59
See also: Yurtoglu, Ownership structure, Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Turkish Business Groups, 1999
6 See Myers and Majluf (1986) for a full exposition. See also Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu; Corporate Governance and the 
Determinants of Investment, 2007 
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Under these assumptions, it is possible that only firms with sufficient cash flows can 
realize those attractive investment opportunities. Not surprisingly, there are also 
studies which support exactly the opposite aspect that the firms rely less on their 
cash flows for investment when they face least financial constraints, but for the goal 
of this study it is more convenient to consider the first aspect. 7  Most studies tested 
asymmetric information problem by estimating the following investment equation8: 
(2.1)                        
               t t-1 a,t-1 t      I = a +cCF +bq +μ        
Where tI  stands for investment at time t, t-1CF  for cash flows from previous period, a
the average return on total assets (also represents Tobin’s q but explained later), 
band c for the related parameters, tμ  for the residual and finally a,t-1q stands for the 
ratio between the market value of firm and the replacement cost of capital (Q-
Theory). It states that the investments should rise with q. In other words, the firm is 
more likely to invest if the market value exceeds the replacement cost of capital
(profitability of investment). To eliminate the endogeneity problems, the explanatory 
part of the equation is lagged. 
AIH of investment is similar to the adverse selection problem in public economics, 
especially in field of insurance where some individuals give missing or wrong 
information to insurance companies to reduce the monthly payment which forces the 
companies to a pooling equilibrium which is for the honest individuals not the 
optimum. On the level of corporations the same occur if there is hidden or a cloudy 
information not visible to the creditors. In corporate governance, monitoring is of 
great interest, because investors want to be aware of the business strategies and 
actions taken by managers. It is previously mentioned that investors are not limited to 
internal agents such as shareholders (this point will be discussed later while referring 
MDH). Assumptions of the theory also indicate that financial institutions in external 
markets must be also considered, since issuing shares for funding investment is not 
always the best idea. 
                                                
7 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999).
8 Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu; Corporate Governance and the Determinants of Investment, 2007
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In reality, far from these extreme theoretical aspects, as firms have started to rely 
more on external funds rather than cash flows, credit rating agencies such as S&P 
and Fitch have become more popular, especially during the last decades. 
Improvements have also been made in the banking sector, particularly in 1990s (e.g. 
Basel II) while the global business has become more risk-averse because of volatile 
horizon and huge bankruptcies. All of these evidences caused more expensive bank 
loans especially to those firms with poor credit histories. For instance, in the practice 
of credit risk management, it is necessary to be aware of the so-called soft and hard 
facts of the borrower, where soft facts represent industry assessment, management-
and product quality and hard facts represent balance sheet and bank account data. It 
is obvious that hard facts are easy to monitor, however for the soft facts one cannot 
assert the same notion, and this should be the point of interest when investigating the 
level of AI. 
Especially when we consider investment as a mirror for the future profitability of a 
firm, financial history in a bank account might be of little interest, because managerial 
reputation and integration degree of the firm to external funds matter more. Under the 
term degree of integration, the relationship-quality and the affinity of target strategies 
between the firm and the financial suppliers must be understood. This degree of 
integration should proxy the level of AI. Precisely, the firm must reflect the perfect 
information about this investment opportunity to its external financial source, stating 
the exact estimated returns on investment. Assume that a firm has an investment 
opportunity which will provide high returns in the long term, but due to its weak cash 
flows and low share price, firm cannot finance this investment with its internal 
resources (e.g. cash flows). A creditor or financial supplier (e.g. Bank) which monitors 
the firm cannot foresee this investment opportunity either because of transparency or 
information problems or just because its target strategies are not the same with those 
of the firm. In this case, a valuable investment opportunity might be missed, which 
could have in return increased the share value and profit and herewith increase the 
utility of shareholders. 
Previously mentioned literature is mostly based on the independent corporations or 
firms. Business groups must be also considered, since some studies found 
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interesting evidence on these those firms which are members of such business 
groups. By analyzing a group-affiliated firm it is very important to search for the 
availability of banks or similar financial suppliers within the same group, because it 
can lead to completely different results than that of the aforementioned literature. The 
reason of this should be that the degree of integration is relatively higher within the 
business groups than that of between independent firms and their external market.   
Previous study from Hoshi et. al. (1991) suggests that the keiretsu members (family 
owned business groups in Japan) have closer links to their main bank (belongs to the 
business group) as to other external financial sources and thereby they don’t face 
difficulties of getting financial support for investment.9  Hence, those group-affiliated 
firms with no profitable investment projects may rely less on their cash flows to invest 
although they would, if they were independent. On the other hand, having a bank or a 
financial supply in a group reduces the cost of monitoring and obtaining information 
on the firm, which can reduce the information asymmetry in case of a profitable
investment opportunity. Hoshi et. al. (1991) also found evidence that independent 
firms which do not belong to keiretsu tend to use more from internal cash flows to 
invest. This could be seen as a severity of AI, that the cost of monitoring is higher for 
the independent firms relative to that of group members. 
Although several business groups have such resources, it is uncertain whether they 
provide well-judged financial support to their family members or not. Shin and Park 
(1999) argued that the internal cross-funding between business group members may 
not be efficient if the net present value (NVP) of the investment is low. The main 
subject in their study was to compare the investment behaviour between chaebol 
(large business groups in Korea) and independent (non-chaebol) firms. Shin and 
Stulz (1998) emphasized another interesting fact in their study that investment 
behaviour of small group-affiliated firms are strongly affected by cash outflow of the 
other large firms with in the same group. Secondly, they found out similarities 
between the investment policy of large group firms and the independent firms.10 On 
account of this, it is beyond dispute to consider the handicap of independent firms 
which have possession of low share values, insufficient cash flows and unreputable 
                                                
9 Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap and Scharfstein D., 1991. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106, 33--60.
10 Shin, H. H., Stulz, R. L., 1992. Are Internal Markets efficient? Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 531-552
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credit rating for issuing debt or equity to finance valuable investment opportunities 
with positive NVP.   
Since Turkey and South Korea are also being investigated in this study, it is plausible 
to refer to the previous analysis of Shin and Park (1999) which is suggesting the 
dependence of investment to availability of internal funds if internal and capital 
markets are not perfect substitutes (absence of MMT).11 More precisely, firms rely 
more on internal financing if the cost of external financing is relatively high. Similar to 
the study of Hoshi et. al. (1991), they found out that investment of a chaebol-member 
is not sensitive to its cash flows because of the availability of cross-funding and 
cross-shares in-between the group. 
Monitoring of corporations is of great importance for debt holders but also 
considerable for shareholders. Some improvements have been made to monitor the 
interest of shareholders in a convenient way. For example, in some developed 
countries, many large corporations have corporate boards which do not always 
consist of only the official directors of corporations, also of the member- executives 
from external business circle to limit managerial incentives. These kinds of reforms 
could be helpful to reduce the concentration of management and control and 
therefore to switch to an attractive, transparent market for investors in developing 
countries.
MDH refers to I-CFS from a different point of view, and concentrates on the conflicts 
caused by managerial investment decisions.12 According to the theory, growth 
seeking managers of irregularly or inefficiently monitored companies, have the 
tendency to underprice firm’s market value by overinvestment. Some important 
assumptions should be considered before the explanations: 
I. Manager’s target function is to accelerate or to sustain the growth of the firm 
without considering the shareholders’ wealth.
                                                
11 Hyun-Han Shin, Young S. Park, 1999; Financing Constraints and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence From Korean‘Chaebols’
12 Kathuria and Mueller, 1995. Marris, 1964
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II. Managers have tendency to allocate the internal funds for investment, rather 
than using loans or issuing equity or debt (Supporting the Pecking Order 
Theory).13
MDH is based on the conflicting utilities of shareholders and managers. Grabowski 
and Mueller (1972) pointed out this fact for some Anglo-Saxon countries and stated 
that the separation between ownership and control boost the principal-agent problem 
between managers and shareholders.14 Shareholders try to maximize their utility 
from increasing firm market value (share prices), whereas manager’s objective is to 
accelerate the growth of the firm through issuing shares or corporate bonds to use 
this capital in investment (which can reduce the firm’s market value), or alternatively 
he/she can provide this financial support through borrowing from external third 
parties. 
More precisely, the manager under MDH has a tendency to reflect the investment 
decision in an opportunistic way, such as relying more on internal funds (or issuing 
shares) by reasoning the higher cost of external funding (creditors or from other third 
parties) although it is not actually reflecting the optimal managerial strategy.15
Furthermore, this action can be resulted as an overinvestment while on the other 
hand maintaining the growth of the firm. A manager under MDH can only support the 
interest of shareholders by paying the difference between the cash flows and the 
invested amount (low investment occasion). In an extreme situation, where the 
manager invests more than rational and the share price fall to the minimum level, it 
can be said that the manager is under the risk of a takeover or a replacement. As 
Yurtoglu et. al. have mention the fact exactly as- “Thus, growth-maximizing managers 
can be expected to choose a level of investment that equates their marginal gains 
from increased investment and growth to their marginal cost from an increase in the 
threat of takeover.” Two hypotheses; AIH and MDH exposed some conflicting 
arguments about the selected factors to differentiate the financially constrained firms 
                                                
13 Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, 
Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221
14 Managerial and Stockholder Welfare Models of Firm Expenditures" (with Henry Grabowski), Review of Economics and   Statistics, 54, February 1972, pp. 
9-24
15 B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Ownership structure, Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Turkish Business Groups, 1999. See also Gugler and Peev, Ownership 
changes and Investment in Transition Countries, ECGI (European Corporate Governance Institute), Finance Working Paper N°. 169/2007, May 2007.
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from the less constrained ones.16 In order to distinguish between these two theories, 
Table 1.1 depicts the relationship between investment and cash flow under the notion 
of these two hypotheses.17
Figure 2.1 AI, MD and optimal investment18
While considering MDH it is important to discuss the managerial concentration in the 
firm. Managerial concentration is determined by the ownership structure. The 
definition behind ownership structure is straightforward; Corporations can be a 
partnership of families, individuals, banks, state, industrial companies or financial 
institutions, etc., as percentage of shares, or oppositely, they can belong completely 
to one of these agents. On the other hand, management concentration should refer 
to the fact that how investment and business decisions are taken and who decides 
for these. For example, in many family corporations in developing countries, 
decisions are taken only through family members or through hired CEOs whereas in 
some corporations consensus or decision of a board of directors is needed to decide 
on business activities which are in the center of interest of shareholders. It is 
necessary to remark that Shin and Park (1999) found out evidence on the existence 
of MD for Korean Chaebol firms, especially those which have minor shareholders.
Recently, in many large corporations where voting rights are well diversified (Anglo-
Saxon countries), owners have relatively small amount of insider shares. This 
                                                
16 Moyen, 2004; Cleary et al. 2006; Also see: Rejie George, Rezaul Kabir, Jing Qian, Is investment - cash flow sensitivity a good measure of financing 
constraints?
17 See the Section Appendix for the interpretation.
18 r: return on capital, i: cost of capital, I: Investment, CF: Cash flows.
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amount might reflect the link between the incentives of managers and stakeholders.
A previous study from Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) investigated an alternative 
approach for this aspect and concluded significant results. However, this study 
contradicted to the determination of the firm value.19 They have argued and find out a 
non-linear relationship, that the firms (a sample of Fortune 500 firms) in which board 
members have relatively small managerial shareholdings (≤ 5%) exhibit higher 
market values as that of the firms with higher managerial shareholdings (≥ 5%). Their 
study suggests that as the ownership concentration increases, shares become less 
attractive to investors, because they might believe that the managers with large 
shareholdings would react for their own goals. Contradictions which are against this 
evidence concerned the determination of firm’s value, because ownership
concentration is believed to be an insufficient explanatory variable, and instead of 
that one should use the ratio of firm’s market value to its book value.  Figure 2.2 
depicts the finding of Morck et al.
Figure 2.2
Non-linear Relationship between managerial shareholdings and the market value
In a well-diversified financial market where shares represents voting rights, a 
shareholder (e.g. individuals, financial institutions, other companies) can only reduce 
this distance by taking the control and monitor of the firm, if he/she buys a certain 
amount (e.g. 20%) of total stocks, but bearing behind the firm-specific risk of an 
undiversified portfolio. From the point of view of shareholder such an investment 
                                                
19 Morck, R., A., Vishny, R.W., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315
18         
might be unacceptable risky and unfortunately can lead to the widening the gap 
between the interests of managers and shareholders if the ownership is highly 
concentrated on one person or a corporation. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries, 
the latter is valid for Continental European Countries. Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
(2007) reported that the ownership concentration lies over 14% for United States, 
15% for the other Anglo-Saxon countries and 40% for the Continental Europe.20  It is 
useful to refer to the fact that, Anglo-Saxon (English spoken countries, e.g. USA, 
England, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, etc.)  Economies are observed to be more 
liberal, where governments provide less service with a low taxation, whereas 
Continental Economies are observed to be less liberal where government provides 
more services with a relatively higher taxation.21
2.3 Legal Origin, AI and MD
The most obvious distinction between the countries of sample is their legal origin.22
Grinblatt and Titman (2002) find out that the countries maintaining strong legal 
systems for the protection of outside (excluding insider shareholdings) shareholders 
have relatively large and active stock markets to that of the countries with weaker 
protection for outside shareholders where fewer new companies going public.23 This 
evidence suggests that there is a strong correlation between increased stock market 
activity and investor protection. Moreover, using a sample of 49 countries, LSSV
(1997) stated another conclusion about the legal origin, considering legal systems 
and ownership concentration which was a milestone of the theory of the legal origin.24
They pointed out that the small shares of ownerships in Anglo-Saxon countries are 
relatively more protective against managerial incentives than the legal systems are in 
Continental European Economies. 
There are two leading legal systems throughout the world, namely The Common Law 
and The Civil Law. Common Law is used mostly in English spoken- or in the post-
(English)-colony-countries. Main property of this system is that, it draws abstract 
                                                
20 Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu; Corporate Governance and the Determinants of Investment, 2007
21 Katinka Barysch; Liberal versus Social Europe, CER Bulletin, ISSUE 43, Centre for European Reform, 2005
22 See Data (Section 5) for the definition.
23 Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman; Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy, 2002, pages: 627- 651
24 R. Vishny, Lopez-de-Silanes, F. , R. La Porta, A. Shleifer 1997; Legal Determinants of External Finance. Journal of Finance, LII, pages: 1131-1150
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rules from specific cases, where the cases are primary sources of law. This system 
tries to balance the powers between legislative and executive organs. French, 
Scandinavian and German legal systems are common types of Civil Law which starts 
with the abstract rules and applies these to specific cases. In contrast to Common 
Law, this system separates the legislative and executive organs, where the 
legislation is the primary source of cases.
Legal system should have an impact at both macro-and micro- levels, namely, on 
country-, company-, or borrower- level. For the country-level La Porta et al. (1998)
pointed out the superiority of English Common Law against other law systems. 
Similarly, Beck, Kunt and Levine (2003) found evidence on the borrower-level and 
argued that the private sector credit as a percentage of GDP is significantly lower in 
countries of French legal origin. Besides, an important finding about the firm-level 
was introduced by John, Litov and Yeung (2004), stating that the companies enjoying 
better legal protection take on more risk, and that firms taking on more risk grow 
faster.
My sample countries have different legal origins which are shown in Table 2.1. I have 
used the data which was introduced by the previous studies of LSSV (1996 and 
1997). Moreover I have divided the countries into two groups by using a dummy 
variable which takes 1 if the country belongs to English Legal Origin and zero 
otherwise. My first prediction in this thesis is that the firms in countries of common 
law (Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) should exhibit lower level 
of AI and/or MD relative to those firms in other legal systems (Indonesia, Korea, 
Philippines, Taiwan and Turkey) and therefore the firms of common law would be 
less dependent to cash flows for investment (lower 1  if Legal Origin= English).  
2.4 Corruption Level, AI and MD
In developing countries where investor protection is generally weak, growth seeking 
companies which have tight relations with governments could turn out to be favoured 
against the counterparts which might lead to MD. On the other hand, profitable 
foreign direct investment projects could be harmed through corruption where foreign 
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firms cannot enter the domestic market might lead to AI. Consider a situation as an 
example; if the bribe paid by the local firm is smaller than the total foreign direct 
investment returns to GDP, than that foreign firm would be indirectly subjected AI. A 
previous findings from Smarzynska and Wei (2000) provided evidence about the 
diminishing FDI and also the tendency of ownership identity towards joint venture as 
the corruption level of the subjected country increases. Parallel to this evidence, 
Sarkar and Hasan (2001) pointed out the positive effect of the decrease in corruption 
level of the host country to the productivity and volume of investments.
I used Corruption Perception Index (hereafter CPI) of Transparency International 
Berlin as an interaction variable for my investment equation. CPI is a composite index 
and expected to be a measure of perceived corruption in different countries. The 
disadvantage of the index is that the ratings highly depend on the perception of 
limited number of experts, business people and institutions chosen for each country, 
rather than public agents. Thus, CPI is far from being a population survey. The 
advantage of the index is that the scores are obtained from the experienced, reliable 
channels which are directly faced with the level of corruption in the country; hence 
the CPI is less affected from the misleading information provided by public or media 
agents which could be also exposed to corruption. Transparency International 
defines the CPI as follows: “CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector, and 
defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain…If a country is 
believed to be corrupt, but is willing to reform, this should serve as a signal to donors 
that investment is needed in systemic approaches to fight corruption. And if donors 
intend to support major development projects in corrupt countries, they should pay 
particular attention to corruption ‘red flags’ and make sure appropriate control 
processes are set up to limit graft…The country with the lowest score is the one 
perceived to be the most corrupt of those included in the index…While ranking 
countries enables Transparency International to build an index, a country’s score is a 
much more important indication of the perceived level of corruption in a country…The 
index primarily provides an annual snapshot of the views of business people and 
country analysts, with less of a focus on year-to-year trends.”25
                                                
25 Article is taken from the Transparency International Report for CPI 2004.
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Figure 2.3 and 2.4 depicts the corruption and FDI levels of each country for years 
2000, 2005 and 2006. Similar to the latter two findings there is a positive relationship 
between FDI and corruption levels but in different proportions The highest value of 
FDIs and the lowest CPIs belongs to Hong Kong and Singapore whereas the the 
lowest FDIs and the highest CPIs belong to Philippines and Indonesia respectively. 
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Figure 2.3: Corruption Levels
Source: The World Bank; World Development Indicators Database, April 2008. Department of 
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Figure 2.4: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among the sample-countries
Source: The World Bank; World Development Indicators Database, April 2008. Department of 
Investment Services, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan
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Note that, since the content of the survey differs from year to year there is no 
standard criterion for the CPI. In my sample the countries are subjected to different 
perceived corruption levels which are shown below in Table 2.1. I took the CPI of 
2000 as the base value for my estimations. 
The related data on CPI between 2000 and 2004 can be found in the Appendix-
Section. I have divided the countries into two groups; high corruption- (CPI < 4) and 
the low corruption (CPI   4) - groups by using a dummy variable which take 1 if the 
country belongs to low corruption- group and zero otherwise. The CPI is indexed 
from 1 (highest corruption) to 10 (lowest corruption) for each country. Hence, my first 
prediction in this thesis concerns with the level of corruption and its effect on 
investment behaviour as well as the level of AI and/or MD.26 Frankly, the firms of 
countries of lower perceived corruption (Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Taiwan) should be less dependent to cash flows for investing, than those firms of 
countries of higher perceived corruption (India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Turkey). Therefore, it should be exactly that; lower the CPI lower the 1  .      
Table 2.1: Legal Origins and Corruption Levels of the Sample Countries
ENG: English, FR: French, GER: German. Range (CPI) = (1,10), 1 for the highest corruption, 10 for 
the lowest corruption
2.5 Some real cases concerning AI and MD
Firms must make investment decisions so as to remain competitive in a global 
growing market. These types of investments could be the reason for either expanding 
their borders within the market by increasing the market share or just for insuring the 
status quo. If we deduct these investments and taxation (e.g. corporate tax) from 
gross cash flows (after EBIT and accruals), we can determine free cash flows which 
                                                
26 See Methodology for the predictions.
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can be used either as a positive return on shareholders as well as debt holders or as 
a source for further investment plans.27 From managerial perspective the main 
objections are investors, customers, suppliers and employees. A manager must 
assign weights for each of these objections. More precisely, the firm should make a 
decision about the amount of cash leftover to maintain the firm’s future sustainability.
Managers have also other choices for financing investment; bank loans, issue of debt 
or equity. A study of Opler and Titman (1994) found out a significant evidence for the 
U.S firms between 1976 and 1993, stating that managers prefer debt issuing when 
the share prices are low, and they favour equity issuing if the share prices are high. 
Furthermore, they showed that the firms with low asymmetric information problems 
tend to issue equity whereas the leveraged firms with small amount of debts prefer 
issuing debt for financing investment.28 A supporting research by Dittmar and Thakor 
(2007) on U.S exchanges between 1993 and 2002 reported also some evidence, that 
is in fact against the Pecking Order Theory from Myers and Majluf (1984)29, which 
states that, for financing investment, managers tend to rely firstly on income from 
operations (cash inflows) and then on riskless debt, then on risky debt and lastly in
case of an extreme situation on equity.30  
It is very obvious, that the taken actions for investment cannot always satisfy the 
pareto-efficiency between the firm and its investors. In other words, it is complicated 
to find an equilibrium point in real life where the taken action from one party does not 
harm the utility of the other part. It is actually not more than a balancing problem 
between the benefits of financiers (share and debt holders) and managers. 
Companies which invest in capital markets seek positive return such as increased 
profits whereas shareholders expect to receive positive returns, such as dividends or 
increased share prices.31 There is some evidence from history, in which the 
incentives of managers harm the benefits of shareholders. For instance, Enron Case 
is a good confirmation for the casualties of insider problem, asset stripping and the AI
and/or MD problem leading to moral hazard in an overpriced enterprise. Similarly, 
                                                
27 Kruschwitz, Löffler; Discounted Cash Flow, A theory of Valuation of Firms, pp:2-3 
28 Tim Opler, Sheridan Titman; The Debt-Equity Choice: An Empirical Analysis, 1994
29 Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, 
Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221
30 Dittmar, Amy K. and Thakor, Anjan V., "Why Do Firms Issue Equity", Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, No. 1, February 2007
31 Denzil Watson and Antony Head; Corporate Finance, Principles & Practice, Pages: 1- 22
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Parmalat was another huge corporation which let a considerable amount of debt to 
the state after its collapse. Parmalat can be seen as evidence of bankruptcy as a 
consequence of overinvestment (or relatively higher negative cash flows), accounting 
and agency problems assisted by reputable rating companies and banks that led to 
adverse selection from the point of view of shareholders. These two examples are 
subjected to global companies of broad board of directors, but there are also some 
other findings, especially the case of Occidental Petroleum is of interest. Occidental 
Petroleum was founded by a single person called Armand Hammer in 1920s and 
later on listed as one of the compelling and successful oil companies in USA. 
However, through 1980s until 1991 the death of Mr. Hammer, the company chose a 
strategy of investment which was only concentrated on the personal incentive of the 
founder rather than regarding the benefits of shareholders. The strategy was to build 
a museum for Hammer’s art collection at a value of $120 million which was 
afterwards responded by the shareholders, resulting in decreased share value. In 
1989 Hammer influenced the stock value through a rumour which was stating that he 
was seriously ill. This news was a motivation for shareholders, for those who expect 
a managerial replacement and share prices went up 3$ per share which indicated 
$300 increase in shareholder value, although it was later published that  he was just 
in a routine check up in a hospital.32 This event clears the fact that if manager’s 
investment decision is not correlated with shareholders’ objectives, it could damage 
the firm by reducing the firm value. Incentives and information problems complicate 
the efforts for reaching mutual benefits for both sides. AI and MD- Hypotheses assert 
this dilemma supporting the positive I-CFS under two different aspects. 
3 Ownership Structure and Investment
The ownership structure of firms is important determinant of investment. There 
should be a difference in the investment behaviour between firms indicating different
types of shareholders. Ownership structure can also helpful by determining the type 
of a firm. A firm is called “independent”, if it is directly owned by families and/or 
individuals and it is called “group-affiliated”, if it is a part of diversified business 
                                                
32 Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman; Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy, 2002, pages: 627- 651
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group.33 A previous study of Yurtoglu (1999) distinguished some independent firms, 
which are partly related to business groups, from perfectly independent firms, by only 
considering the direct ownership. (e.g. Holding Company as a major owner). 
It is worth mentioning the fact that the ownership structure can change over time; 
since companies can be seen as organisms that transform according to the 
environmental situations. In this sample we have companies which are observed 
from 1985 to 2004 and therefore some of them might have been subjected to 
mergers and acquisitions. 
It is often criticized by the existing literature that, if the payoffs received as a group-
affiliated or an independent firm differs or not.34 As a matter of interest of this 
analysis, it is necessary to mention that diversified business groups are very common 
in developing countries. In many of these groups, the distance between the 
ownership and control differs. First of all, it is necessary to determine how the control 
is maintained, namely by means of equity or social relations. An example to equity-
related-control could be the vertical-shaped groups (Common in Korea and Turkey) 
which are controlled directly from top seniors or the horizontal-shaped groups which 
are controlled with respect to the percentage of shares (cross-shareholdings). 
Evidence for the social-related-control can be the groups with a family or similar 
social identity which managed by the chosen person(s) from inside the circle to 
maintain the autonomy and permanency. Additionally, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) 
improved a theory stating that the vertical formation of groups is caused by the efforts 
to receive the control-right to cash flows which is closely related to the literature 
investigating I-CFS.35  However being part of a business group or the opposite is not 
the main goal of this study; therefore I gave only brief information about the previous 
findings.  
The sample provides the following data for the ownership structure includes the 
information on differing shareholder types ranking from the 1st largest owner to the 
10th largest owner with respect to percentage shares: 
                                                
22,33 B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Ownership structure, Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Turkish Business Groups, 1999
34 See for entire relevant critics: Khanna and Yafeh; Business Groups in Emerging Markets:  Paragons or Parasites?, 2005 
35 Almeida, H. and D. Wolfenzon; A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups, unpublished manuscript, NYU. 2004
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I. Individual(s) or family(ies),
II. Financial company, 
III. Corporations,
IV. State,
V. Other shareholders, aggregated (more than one shareholder, either containing 
a mixture of companies and individuals or multiple companies),
It is already mentioned that ownership structure is can influence cash flow and 
investment decisions and furthermore the corporate performance as well as the 
levels of AI and MD. Block holders, management authority and voting rights can 
determine the firm’s strategy. 
The existence of family controlled firms has great importance to this study, since this 
type of ownership structure is very common in developing countries. A previous study 
from Lyagoubi (2003) on approximately 700 French family companies between 1995 
and 2000 pointed out, firstly, that AI- problem diminishes as more family companies
go public. Secondly, those family companies which run by a hired CEO from outside 
are more indebted than owner-managed family firms.36 This evidence suggests the 
severity of Principal-Agent Problem (hereafter PAP) in family corporations implying 
the risk of cash flows controlled by outsider managers. On the other hand, AI-
Problem increases with the family-run- management and makes the monitoring of the 
firm more complicated by the external parties, letting them undervalue the investment 
opportunities. Generally, family companies prefer to take the family members in to 
charge to reduce the agency cost. This should be because of that, in many family 
firms the risk on return on investment projects are a part of total risk beared by the 
firm and therefore the family members are tending to be more risk-averse against 
reductions in wealth, caused by high debt issues under bankruptcy risk. Precisely, 
family companies with sufficient net income earned are expected to follow the 
Pecking Order Theory37, relying more on cash flows for investment purposes and 
considering external funds as last resort. This is also a part of my last prediction to 
this thesis.
                                                
36 Lyagoubi, M.; Family firms and financial behaviour: How the preferences of family shareholders influence firm   financing?, IFERA and Family Business 
Network World Conference, Lausanne, 2003.
37Myers, Stewart and Nicholal S. Majluf, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors Do Not Have", Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2.
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 A different aspect referring the early stages of family companies states that, the 
family companies try to maintain the status quo, in other words, the sustainability of 
the managerial autonomy and the company’s existence rather than subsequent 
investments targeting the growth.38 Evidence from the study of Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), investigating the quoted family firms of UK and USA, found out that the firms 
targeting growth and having closer links to their external funds have outperformed the 
other S&P 500-counterparts.39 This existing literature suggests that the private family 
firms (apart from public shares) should face AI-problem if they have poor connections 
with banks or other financial sources. 
Insider ownership is very closely related with family owned companies and certainly 
an evidence which is open for debates concerning its influence on I-CFS, AI and MD. 
As already mentioned before, insider shares can influence the shareholder’s utility in 
two ways. Firstly, for a remarkable amount of insider shares (more than 10%), 
shareholders can believe that the manager is on the mutual path of strategy and 
therefore targeting the shareholder value which could in turn provide an increase in 
share price. Secondly, if the amount of shares is too small, then from the viewpoint of 
shareholders it is more likely that manager could have incentives (MD) not related 
with the shareholders’ interests where low share price and the threat of takeover 
could be its concomitants. It is important here to underline that these two possibilities 
are from the perception of shareholders. Therefore the likelihood of PAP exists. For 
example, Gugler et al. argued about the two conflicting effects of increasing insider 
shares, namely the alignment- and the entrenchment effect.40 According to this 
determination, an increase in insider share can either have positive wealth effect 
(alignment) on the shareholders’ utility or  decrease the possibility of takeover 
(entrenchment) which can lead the manager to pursue his/her own goal.  
Furthermore, Hadlock (1998) points out the fact that, non-linear relationship between 
I-CFS and the insider ownership, where a simultaneous increase in both insider 
                                                
38 Panikkos Zata Poutziouris, the Structure and Performance of the UK Family Business PLC economy, Handbook of Research on Family Business , Elgar 
Publishers, pages: 552-574, 2006.  
39 Anderson, R, and Reeb D. 2003. Founding Family Ownership and Firm Performance, Evidence from the S&P 500. 
The Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1301-1328.
40 Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu; The Effects of Ownership Concentration and Identity on Investment Performance: An 
International Comparison
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shares and I-CFS observed.41 Ownership concentration is another determinant of 
investment behaviour. Financial companies, insurance companies, banks, 
corporations exhibited significant effects on I-CFS, MD and AI in the existing 
literature of corporate governance, as the largest owners (10% of the shares 
outstanding). If a financial institution is the first owner of the firm then it is more likely 
to expect a lower level of AI and a weaker I-CFS for that firm relative to that of family-
or dispersedly owned firms (assuming that the improvements in capital markets are 
the same between the countries). Another important fact is to determine the effect of 
cash flows on investment by considering hard or soft of budget constraints on state-
owned firms from the transition years until today.42 The sample for this empirical 
study consists of 10 economies and some of them are subjected to the post-
communist, post-colonial, post-war stage or coup d’états, and therefore they have a 
transition period (convergence to development) in their history. Until the 1980s the 
state-owned firms were in the dominant role in these economies and most of them 
were supported by the state by means of subsidies or soft budget politics to compete 
against liberal economies, despite huge bankruptcy risks (high MD-level). In this 
sample, the date of establishment of firms ranges from 1862 to 1996 and hence there 
should be firms which are/were owned by the state.43 Gugler and Peev (2007) found 
out evidence that the I-CFS of state-owned firms in transition economies was 
negative during the early transition stage (Soft budget constraint), whereas positive 
thereafter (MD). Similarly, a previous study from Cho (1995) might be a helpful 
evidence for the effect of state subsidies which investigated the changes in fixed 
assets of Korean firms between periods 1982 and 1991 by taking the global oil crisis 
in 1985 as an exogenous shock.44 Cho argued that chaebols which were favoured by 
state during the economic expansion tend to rely less on their cash flows for 
investment. Additionally, several reforms have been made during these transition 
stages, including changes in organic law, in jurisdiction of financial markets, priority 
and creditor rights, privatisation, etc. to reduce the level of AI and/or MD, which is 
parallel with the other finding of Gugler and Peev (2007), stating diminishing I-CFS as 
the markets and corporate governance develop. 
                                                
41 Charles J. Hadlock; Ownership, Liquidity, and Investment, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.29, No. 3, pp.487-508
29,42 See Kornai et al. (2003); Gugler and Peev, Ownership changes and Investment in Transition Countries, ECGI (European Corporate Governance 
Institute), Finance Working Paper N°. 169/2007, May 2007
43 By considering also M&A.
44 Cho, Y. D., 1995. Company Investment Decisions and Financial Constraints: An Analysis of a Panel of Korean Manufacturing Firms. Working Paper, 
School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield
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During my analysis I gave attention only to the largest ownership type with 
shareholdings 10% and the dispersedly owned firms (1st owner has less than 10% 
of the shares outstanding), because I assumed that the firm’s control should be 
dominated by the first owner. It is worth mentioning again that the target of this study 
is to compare the investment behaviour at the country-, rather than at the firm-level. 
Because of the structural differences at country-levels, it is quite complicated to 
differentiate between the behaviour of firms from different economies, although their 
ownership structures seem similar. Assuming that there is no structural difference 
between these economies, I put the firms into the same basket which belong to the 
largest owners of the same type. For my last prediction I put the firms into two 
subsets according to their predicted AI- and/or MD- situations. Family- or dispersedly 
owned firms should belong to the subset of high AI and/or MD-levels, whereas firms 
with the largest owner of other types (state or financial institution or corporations) 
should belong to subset of low AI and/or MD-levels. Frankly, family- or dispersedly 
owned firms should exhibit higher level of AI and/or MD relative to that of the firms of 
other types.   
As it can be seen from the Figure 3.1, there are differing number of observations on 
family-or dispersedly owned firms in each sub-sample. Those firms in Taiwan 
constitute the largest, whereas those in Indonesia the smallest fraction of the pooled 
sample. 
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(With respect to largest owners) 
Number of observed firms / Total observations
Figure 3.2 shows that other firms (owned by financial institution, corporation or state) 
with respect to largest shareholders are less observed than family-or dispersedly 
owned firms, for all countries except Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. Totally, 
there are 5750 observations on family-or dispersedly owned firms, whereas 2347 
observations of firms of other types of aforementioned largest shareholders.  
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Figure 3.2: Firms owned by State, Financial Institutions or Corporations
(With respect to largest owners) 
Number of observed firms / Total observations
4. The Data
The reliance of the information gathered from sample firms is of great importance to 
maintain the significance and the consistency of the analysis. Thus, the most reliable 
data can be obtained from the stock exchange-listed company of origin, which should 
provide more transparency during analysis, especially when the objection is an 
emerging economy. However, one must pay attention to the total stock market 
capitalizations which are varying from one country to another and almost 
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independent of the GDP levels of the related countries.45 Table 4.1 shows the 
differing levels of change in the stock market capitalization of the countries that are
being analyzed.  Those numbers are measured in billions US-Dollars. It is clear that 
there are huge differences in the size and annual changes between the stock market 
of these countries. Although the source of information belongs to year 2006, it is clear 
that (2 years after the end period of this sample) South Korea, India, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are close to each other in size. The same can be thought for Singapore, 
Malaysia, Turkey, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines but for the lower levels of 
capitalization with poor annual change. Other than this, if someone takes the total 
market capitalization in USA as a reference, then it can lead to surprising results; the 
market cap of USA is 20 trillion $ which is almost 30 times larger than the market 
capitalization of South Korea indicating a huge gap in-between. An anecdote from 
this paper can be helpful to explain this gap: “…One company, General Electric, if 
placed on this list, would be between Taiwan and Mexico to take 9th place…” Since 
my study concerns more with the relative numbers than the absolute ones, it only 
matters to understand the market conditions of these countries before comparison.  
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Source: The Futurist; Stock Market Capitalization in Developing Countries, July 2006
Size of the stock market as well as the improvements in jurisdictions of financial 
markets of a developing country is of great interest. In countries where the market 
                                                
45 The Futurist; Stock Market Capitalization in Developing Countries, July 2006.
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capitalization is large, it could be the case that  the cost of monitoring is low or the 
link between firms and third parties are close or the legal and accounting systems are 
well-improved, than it is presumable that the AI and/or MD should lose ground in 
those countries. Figure 4.2 depicts the market capitalizations as well as the GDP 
values of the countries of sample.
34,9
199,75
34,2
75,91
33,5
511,66
368,6
169,12
81
321,23
16,3
165,02
129,5
90,32
24
122,73
164,8
92,72
32,2
460,2
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
TUR PHL KOR HGK TWN IDN MYS THA SGP IND
COUNTRIES
MARKET CAPITALIZATIONS AND GDP
Market Cap(% of GDP) GDP (current US$) (billions)
Figure 4.2: Market Cap and GDP of the sample-countries
Source: The World Bank; World Development Indicators Database, April 2008. Department of 
Investment Services, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan
It should be clear that, since the explanation of investment should not uniquely 
depend on cash flows, one must also bear in mind the effects of other explanatory 
factors affecting investment decisions taken by companies such as size, sector, 
ownership structure, total assets, depreciation rates, leverage, age, date of 
establishment etc.
In this sample there are some data on important characteristics of firms which can be 
helpful to determine the investment behaviour, as well as to compare the countries.
Additionally, there are also some string variables which specify some features of the 
firms, such as date of incorporation, year of observation, company name, main 
exchange market, industry definition (SIC) and the unique identifier which can be 
used as a tool to distinguish each firm from another. Hence, it is necessary to 
describe the logic behind some factors before beginning with the estimations.
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4.1 Cash Flow (CF)
According to the general accepted accounting principles there are three categories 
for defining the change in cash (in-or -outflow) amount between two accounting 
periods and classified as follows: cash provided or used by (1) operating activities, 
(2) investing activities, and (3) financing activities.46 Respectively; cash provided/used 
by operating activities are the cash flows from sales or provided services (including 
cash paid to employees and inventory purchases), cash provided/used by investing 
activities are making and collecting of loans and acquiring and disposing of debt and 
equity investments and property, plant and equipment, and lastly the cash 
provided/used by financing activities are the cash flows from borrowed (or repaid) 
amounts from (to) creditors, also the cash received from the issuance and cash paid 
for the repurchase of the equity.47 In this study, these three classifications simply 
summarize the importance of cash flow as a necessary source for the sustainability 
of firm, a considerable subject for monitoring and also an efficient candidate for 
determining investment. 
4.2 Tobin’s q (TQ)
Tobin’s q (TQ) represents the ratio between the market value of firm to its total (net 
fixed) assets (COMPUSTAT item number 6) assuming that the firm is free of debt 
and it is in fact an important measure to figure out the average performance 
(management quality) or from a different angle, the severity of agency problems 
regarding investment. Tobin’s q implies the ratio of the return on assets relative to its 
cost of capital (profitability of investment) and therefore used in several studies as an 
indicator of AI-and MD-Level.48  Simply, if the firm has an investment opportunity with 
returns higher than its cost of capital then the ratio ar
i
 must be greater than 1. Then 
for the AI-Hypothesis only the firms matter with ar
i
 greater or equal to 1 and this 
                                                
46,6 Charles W. Mulford and Eugene E. Comiskey; Creative Cash Flow Reporting, Uncovering Sustainable Performance, pages: 1- 10
48,32, 33  See Appendix for the related formulation, also see: Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu; Corporate Governance and the 
Determinants of Investment, 2007
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condition is expected for the small firms which have low degree of integration to 
external links. This leads to a different conclusion for the MD-Hypothesis; an 
overinvesting manager targets only the growth of the firm, not the wealth-
maximization of the shareholders. Hereby, one can capture such an investment 
approach if the return on investment smaller than its cost of capital, thus  ar
i
 must be 
smaller than 1. Then for MDH only the firms matter with ar
i
smaller or equal to 1 and 
this condition is expected. Additionally, in case of ar
i
equal to 1 the book value 
represents the market value and moreover firm does not undertake such an 
investment.49  However, using TQ in an investment equation can be criticized. The 
reason is quite clear; TQ represents the reflection of changes in firm’s market value 
(perceived future profitability) on its investment, but firms actually do not invest 
according to the movements in their market value. Generally, for the investment 
decisions matters only the net present value of the firm in which the investment 
projects are evaluated according to future payment (Discounted cash inflow)-
streams. Therefore, a rational firm (without MD) would invest as long as the NVP of 
the marginal return on investment is positive. Lastly, it would not undertake an 
investment if the NVP marginal return is negative.
4.3 Total assets and Fixed Assets (Net)
Total assets include all investment activities, all cash-convertible current assets and 
fixed assets. Total assets can also be a good indicator of firm’s size and herewith 
firm’s financial constraints. It is very important to pay particular attention to the size of 
company since it varies within the sample and also expected to be strongly correlated 
with investment decisions which affect the outcome of the analysis. Size of a firm can 
depend on several indicators such as market size, market capitalisation, wages, 
industry type, country’s environment, financial market conditions, judicial system and 
R&D investments. Krishna B. et. al. (1999) provides significant evidence on a positive 
relation between the market size and firm size from a sample of 15 developed 
European Countries. Moreover they pointed a positive correlation between size of 
R&D intensive companies and judicial improvements (negative correlation between 
                                                
31 See Table 1.1
35         
size of capital intensive companies and judicial developments). Their study also 
supports the evidence that the capital intensive companies are larger in size if the 
financial markets are better improved.50 Fixed assets can be regarded as tangible 
and intangible fixed assets. Tangible fixed assets are for long-term-use purpose, 
exposed to depreciation such as buildings, plants or machinery and have low degree 
of cash-convertibility. Intangible fixed assets represent the physically intangible 
assets such as patent, goodwill, mining exploration, brand, legal rights, design etc. 
and usually measured initially by cost of acquisitions.51
4.4 Additions to fixed assets
Additions to fixed assets represent the change in the growth of the firm by means of 
changes in its tangible and intangible fixed assets. These alterations can be seen as 
a proxy for investment, therefore its ratio with lagged total assets (can be seen as 
returns on total assets after one period) is selected as the dependent variable of the 
investment equation. Attention must be paid while using fixed assets as a proxy for 
investment, especially if one tries to compare this sample with a US sample of firms. 
For instance, Shin and Park (1999) have commented that, if a firm invests more on 
R&D by selling its fixed assets, it can appear that firm’s capital expenditure on fixed 
assets is negative, although it is in reality positive. The reason behind could be that 
the capital expenditures might differ from the changes in fixed assets. For simplicity I 
assume that the accounting terms have the same definition through out the whole 
sample.       
4.5 Long term debt
Long term debt refers to the assets owed to suppliers or creditors which are due 
more than or equal to one year and includes bank loans, debentures, convertible 
debt, lease liabilities and other long term interest bearing debt. Long term debts can 
be helpful to clarify the credibility of the firm from external parties. The amount of 
                                                
50 Krishna B. Kumar, Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales, NBER Working Paper No. 7208, Issued in July 1999
51 Yoshinori Kawamura; Accounting News in Japan, http://www2g.biglobe.ne.jp/~ykawamur/
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external debt could be an efficient determinant of firms’ reputation and history from 
the vision of creditors. In other words, if the amount of debt is high, than the link 
between the firm and third parties should be close. However, I prefer to be bounded 
with the traditional point of view and therefore expect that firms with high current 
liabilities or long term debts have higher I-CFS. More precisely, if the firm has a high 
amount of debt it cannot cover it from a different creditor and hence use its internal 
funds for financing its debt and for other investment opportunities.
4.6 Operating revenue / turnover (sales)
Operating revenue / turnover stands for the amount received from the net sales and 
other revenues of the firm. 
4.7 Depreciation and Depletion
Depreciation and depletion are a part of cash flows (e.g. cash outflows for investing 
activities). Especially in the field of manufacturing industry they make up an important 
part of CF. Depreciation can be seen as a replacement investment, but non-cash 
charges which is defined periodically as a part of gross investment. In other words it 
is a cost of investment (provision) which in return indirectly affects the profit after the 
business period. Fixed assets are exposed to depreciation and to clarify the change 
in investment during a whole period one must sum up the change in the stock of 
depreciable capital of previous period plus the depreciated capital of the current 
period. Depletion is another factor to be considered, especially for the industrial 
sector where non-renewable raw materials used as input for production. Depletion 
can affect consumer price index (especially for the goods with low elasticity of 
demand) as well as cash flows and further the operating life of the firm, that’s why 
there is a global upward-trend in R&D investments for renewable resources 
particularly in fields of mining and oil industry. 
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4.8 Market Value
Market value is defined as the market value of common equity (share price at the end 
of the fiscal year- Item 199 / COMPUSTAT) times common shares outstanding (Item 
25/COMPUSTAT) plus the book value of preferred stock (Items 56, 10, 130/ 
COMPUSTAT) plus the book value of total debt (the sum of the current liabilities-
Item 9 / COMPUSTAT) and total long term debt (total long term debt- Item 34 / 
COMPUSTAT).Market value can be an efficient indicator of firm’s actual size and 
also necessary for calculating the Tobin’s q. Market value can vary across time, due 
to asset sales, acquisitions or stock repurchases but generally due to expected 
profitability.  However, this parameter is commonly based on the market estimation 
including market perception, expectations from future and it is not directly related to 
firm’s historical background, therefore it can differ often from the book value of the 
firm. That is why I assume for simplicity that the financial markets are efficient and 
prices reflect the perfect information. A positive correlation is expected between firm’s 
market value and external funding. Firms with large caps are generally large 
corporations with a stable history in credit ratings and hence they are likely to reduce 
the risk of default from the point of view of financial suppliers. 
4.9 Book value
Book value of a firm is the sum of its shareholders’ equity. In other words, it 
represents the total value of shares owned by those shareholders who have superior 
rights attached to their shareholdings. Book value can often differ from the market 
value, since it represents the value from the balance sheet, hence not the market 
perceptions.
4.10 Income before extraordinary items
According to the accounting standards, income before extraordinary items is the 
amount of income of the firm after all expenses but before paying provisions or 
dividends and is a part of the firm’s income statement to its managers and 
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investors.52 Summing this amount with the depreciation and dividends paid (or 
provisions) one can get the amount of cash flows of the firm open for investing, 
operating or financing activities. 
5. METHODOLOGY
The observations (including the missing values on some variables) construct an
unbalanced cross-section time series (panel) data on 10 developing economies 
between periods 1985 and 2004. The source of this is the COMPUSTAT Global 
Vantage of Standard and Poor’s.53 There are a total of 43038 observations from 2300
firms from different industries.  
The development of financial markets, number of transactions, legal systems and 
type of ownership structures vary across countries. Since the goal of this cross-
country study is to investigate and compare the I-CFS under the two hypotheses of
AI and MD, the aforementioned indicators (Legal Origin, CPI, ownership structure)
are interacted with the independent variables in the investment equation.   
Before beginning with the estimations I will give brief information on each country to 
compare the economies in a qualitative way. Afterwards, there will be an international 
comparison on the investment behaviour. An important assumption should be made 
to control for the changes in the ownership structure. Hence, I will assume that the 
ownership structure of all firms remain constant during the period 1985-2004. 
Moreover, the accounting terms are also assumed to be the same across countries, 
otherwise all terms which are used in the investment equation would be invalid.  
In order to determine the cash flows one needs the income before extraordinary 
items (IB), total depreciation (DEP) and dividends (DIV) paid. Since there is no 
information on dividends I will regard to cash flow as of the following form:
(5.1)                                         t t t tCF =IB +DEP -Div
                                                
52 Standard & Poor's, a division of the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc, 2001
53 See References
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Cash flows do not imply any quantitative information if its ratio to firm’s total assets is 
not specified. This ratio would imply the ability of firm to generate cash flows given its 
size:
(5.2)                                        
t
t
t
CF
Cash Flow Ratio =
K
As I have already mentioned in the previous sections, Tobin’s q  is a useful measure 
defining firm’s performance and investment opportunities and helpful to analyse AI-
and MD levels. It is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm (MV) plus the 
book value of total debt plus long term debt (LTD)) to its total assets and can be 
represented as:
(5.3)                                       
t t
t
t
MV + LTD
TQ =
K
Similar with that of the existing literature, the investment equation (without the 
indicators) takes the form:
(5.4)                           
 
 
 
it it -1
i t 1 2 it -1 it
it -1 it -1
I CF
= α + λ + β + β TQ +u
K K
The subscript t stands for the year and i for the firms. Right side of the investment 
equation is lagged one period and all variables are scaled with the net fixed assets to 
avoid endogeneity problems and size-specific errors respectively. Moreover, each 
variable is normalized by the relevant consumer price index (inflation as %) of each 
year to receive real values where 1995 is taken as the base year. Additions to fixed 
assets can be taken from the data as a proxy for investment ( tI )  which is equal to 
the capital stock of the recent year minus the capital stock of the previous year minus 
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the depreciated capital stock of the previous year. iα denotes industrial dummies 
(with respect to SIC table) and  tλ  the time dummies (1985-2004). CF  stands for the 
sum of the net profit after tax and depreciation. Tobin’s q  is denoted by TQ, residual 
by itu .
The main goal of my study is to estimate the investment equation separately for each 
of the aforementioned interaction variables (Legal Origin, CPI and ownership 
structure) to compare the effects of these factors as the determinants of investment.  
After adding those terms the investment equation takes the form:
(5.5)        
   
   
   
t it-1 it-1
i t 1 2 it-1 1 LO,CPI,OS 2 LO,CPI,OS it-1 it
it-1 it-1 it-1
I CF CF
=α +λ +β +βTQ +δD +δ D TQ +ε
K K K
Where LO,CPI,OSD  stands for the dummies of Legal Origin, Corruption Perception Index 
and the ownership structure (used separately) respectively.54
This study introduces 2 different LS-estimations (Equations 5.4 and 5.5) with and 
without the interaction variables respectively. The main goal is to investigate the 
effects of these three different factors on the investment ( j j  , where j=1, 2) by 
using CF and TQ as tools. Note that t-values are corrected by White’s H.C.S.H55 in 
case of a suspicion on heteroskedasticity.  
    
                                                
54 The notation 
jδ
 is referred from Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics, A Modern Approach, South-Western, Div of Thomson Learning;  2nd 
Ed., 2002.
55 White’s Correction for Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors.
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5.1 Setup of the Empirical Analysis:
The following steps are taken during the analysis:
I. Qualitative information and Summary Statistics: Brief history, social, economic 
and politic profiles of each country.
II. Quantitative Information and the Regression Analyses: Summary Statistics, 
and LS-Estimations. Interpretation of the results, statistical significance of the 
coefficients (t-test, F-test etc.), 
III. Conclusions: I predict supporting evidences for the following 3 theses:
1) “The firms in countries of common law (Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand) should exhibit lower level of AI and/or MD relative to 
those firms in other legal systems (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan and 
Turkey) and therefore the firms of common law would be less dependent to 
cash flows for investment (if Legal Origin= English        lower I-CFS or 1δ < 0 ).”
2) “The firms of countries of lower perceived corruption (Hong Kong, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan) should be less dependent to cash flows for 
investing, than those firms of countries of higher perceived corruption (India, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey). (CPI=Low   lower I-CFS 
or 1δ < 0 ).” 
3) Family- or dispersedly owned firms should belong to the subset of high AI 
and/or MD-levels, whereas firms with the largest owner of other types (state or 
financial institutions or corporations) should belong to subset of low AI and/or 
MD-levels. Hence, family- or dispersedly owned firms should exhibit higher 
level of AI and/or MD relative to that of the firms of other types. (If family or 
dispersed ownership         lower I-CFS or 1δ < 0 ).
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6. COUNTRIES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Countries will be discussed separately due to their differing characteristics. The aim 
of this section is to give sufficient information on the social, economic and politic 
perspectives of each country.56 To generalize, it is now necessary to point out that 
most of the East Asian economies of the sample suffered from the Asian crisis in 
1998 and it played a trigger-effect in their capital markets’ development. Beginning 
with this shock, significant improvements have been made in banking, money and 
stock exchange markets to reduce the risks of investment and to sustain the 
transparency. The most important strategy was to reduce the dependency to banks 
for capital investments through increasing stock market participation of the 
companies and attracting the investors to stock exchange markets via improvements 
in the monitoring and investor-minority shareholder-rights. However, despite all of 
these improvements, the markets are still relatively smaller (not well-diversified), 
transaction costs are higher and the capital markets are less liquid on average than 
those of the developed western economies. 
Note that, in the country information section, the CPI values are from the CPI 2007 
and therefore represents the latest ranking of each country. I used the rankings of 
year 2000 as the base year in my estimations.  Since there is no distinct volatility 
among the CPI –values of the sample countries, any choice between 2000 and 2004 
could be also plausible. 
6.1 Country Information 
       
6.1.1 Hong Kong
Hong Kong as the Hong Kong Administrative Region is dependent to China in the 
field of defence and foreign relations since 1997 after receiving the sovereignty from 
UK. Hong Kong has its own legal and monetary system supporting the government 
non-intervention. It exhibits the highest GDP per capita within the borders of China 
and the 6th in the overall world ranking as of 2006. Furthermore, it is ranked for 
                                                
56 Please visit the literature section for the referred country literature.  
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thirteen successive years as the world’s freest economy in the index of economic 
freedom. Hong Kong has a free capital market with low corporate taxation. As one of 
the pioneer trading territories of the world it has a national currency, Hong Kong 
dollar which is pegged to USD under the fixed exchange rate regime. Hong Kong’s 
imports are generally the raw materials and food due to the scarcity of the natural 
resources. Hong Kong Stock exchange exhibits the second highest value of initial 
public offering (IPO) after London, with a market capitalization of 2.97 Trillion USD as 
of October 2007. Hong Kong has been ranked as the 3rd best financial center in the 
world and the best in Asia for year 2007. Before the sovereignty the dominant sector 
in the economy was the manufacturing which had been transferred mostly to the 
hinterland China. Thereafter, government went through with the laissez-faire policy 
as many companies declared IPO. Recently, the manufacturing covers only 9% of 
GDP, where the service sector is in the leading position with 90%. Hong Kong is one 
of the four Asian Tigers with a fast-moving industrialization and economic growth. It 
suffered from a 5.3% decrease in the GDP after the Asian Crisis in 1998 but with the 
support of the developments in capital markets, it recovered again in 2000 with a 
10% increase. From 2000 until 2005 Hong Kong has exercised a deflationary period 
by reducing cost of production to attract the foreign and domestic investments. At the 
end of this stage the annual inflation was near 0%. Hong Kong is ranking as 14th out 
of 180 countries in the CPI as of 2007 indicating the second lowest perceived 
corruption within the whole sample.
6.1.2 India
Republic of India is the most populous multiethnic democracy and the 7th largest 
country in the world. After colonisation in 1947, India gained its independence and 
became a nation-state. As of the 2006 Report of IMF, it is the 12th largest economy 
with respect to market exchange rates and 3rd largest with respect to the purchasing 
power. India has exercised quasi-socialist stage in the post-colony period by strict 
control of state on the fields of private and trade sector and also on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Throughout some economic reforms it has became one of the rapid 
growing economies and opened its market gradually (since 1991) to the global chain 
by reducing the government control on international trade and private sector. 
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Privatizations played also a leading role to attract FDI. Recently, the economy suffers 
from poverty where 27.5% of the population living below the poverty line with 10% of 
income groups earning approximately 30% of the total income as of 2004 and 2005. 
As a developing economy, India fulfils the convergence hypothesis with an average 
9.4% increase in GDP rate as of 2006 and 2007. GDP is contributed by 54% from 
services, 28% from agriculture and related industries and 18% from industry, 
respectively. India’s leading industry fields are automobile, chemicals, cement 
consumer electronics, food processing, machinery, mining, petroleum, steel and 
pharmaceuticals. It became an important outsourcing destination for multinational 
corporations. India is ranking as 72nd out of 180 countries jointly with Mexico,
Morocco, Peru and Suriname in the CPI as of 2007 indicating third highest perceived 
corruption ahead of Indonesia and Thailand among the countries of this sample. 
6.1.3 Indonesia
Republic of Indonesia is the world’s 4th most populous country. Indonesia entered the 
transitory stage through development after World War II by gaining its independence
(Dutch colonisation). Indonesia is a unitary state with 3 organs governed 
constitutionally. During the early development stage it suffered from the political 
instability and economic nationalism which deteriorated the economic sustainability. 
In the middle of 1960s Indonesia has declared the degree of discipline which 
targeted low inflation, currency stabilisation to attract FDI. Until early 1990s it has 
profited from FDI. There have been developments especially in the manufacturing 
sector which became dominant for the exports. After maintaining an average GDP 
growth rate of 7% from 1989 to 1997 it became one of the fastest growing economies
in the world. However, the aftermath of the Asian Crisis in 1998 had demolishing 
effects on the whole economy followed by a 13% fall in GDP, currency devaluation. 
Thereafter, the political instability and half-way economic reforms accelerated the 
corruption in the levels of government and private sector and complicated the 
process of recovery. Also, the oil prices had a negative effect on the poverty level 
because the leading export good was the crude oil. Indonesia’s GDP consists of 
services by 45.3%, industry by 40.7% and agriculture by 14%. It has rich natural 
sources and the major industries are petroleum, gas, textiles and mining. Indonesia is 
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ranking as 143rd jointly with Gambia, Russia and Togo out of 180 countries in the 
Corruption Perception Index CPI as of 2007 indicating the 2nd highest perceived 
corruption among the countries of this sample.
6.1.4 Malaysia 
Malaysia is the federation of 13 states and 3 federal territories. It was a colony of 
United Kingdom until 1946 and gained its independence in 1957. Malaysia had a 
transition period which took the economy from being reliant on mining and agriculture 
to an economy that depends more on manufacturing. Malaysia exhibited a fast 
economic development by implementing five-year plans and attaching weight to 
international trade. Especially the Japanese FDIs caused the exports to be the 
growth engine of the whole economy. Between 1980 and 1990 Malaysia had 7% 
average GDP growth with a low taxation. Government sustained a favouring policy 
against some ethnic groups in the field of education, business and housing. In 1998 
the Asian crisis caused huge losses for the economy accelerated with the sharp 
decrease in FDI and increase in capital outflow. Malaysia recovered the losses partly 
by the export of computer electronics. Government ownership plays also an 
important role in industrial sector where the policy is to invest through a fund in 
specific industrial companies for the benefit of the whole country. As of 1999, 
manufacturing sector was 30% of GDP. Agriculture and mining sector was near 9.3% 
and 7.3% respectively. Malaysia has a rich endowment of natural resources, 
particularly in field of agriculture and mining. Malaysia is ranking as 43rd jointly with 
South Africa and South Korea out of 180 countries in the CPI as of 2007 indicating 
the better-than-average perceived corruption among the countries of this sample. 
Malaysia is known as a newly industrialized country (NIC) where the economy is 
below the first-world status but has in a macroeconomic sense outpaced its 
counterparts and exercises a fast economic growth.
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6.1.5 Philippines
The Republic of Philippines is the world’s 12th most populous country and the 37th 
largest economy in the world as of 2006. Philippines was a sequent colony of Spain 
and USA respectively until 1946. The country is accepted to be a newly industrialized 
country which is mostly dependent to agriculture. It is one of the cost-effective 
countries in Asia with a growing demand for business outsourcing. During 1960s the 
economy was the 2nd largest in the Asia, right after Japan. In the following decades 
until 1990s the economy suffered from the government-linked monopolies which 
pushed the country into recession. Thereafter, the economy covered its losses 
gradually through some liberal reforms. Unlikely to its other Asian neighbours, the 
Philippines- economy did not suffer much during the Asian Crisis with the assistance 
of strict fiscal policies boosted by the aid of IMF. Between 2004 and 2007 the 
average GDP growth was 6.5% which was over the mean of Asian economy growth 
rate. Recently, In order to maintain the development program, Philippines continue 
with the privatization of state owned corporations and improvements in taxation. But 
interestingly it is one of the exceptional countries where the contribution of 
remittances to GDP exceeds that of the FDIs. In some country-regions government 
encourages the investment projects to remain in the country-level competition. 
Philippines is ranking as 131st out of 180 in the CPI as of 2007, indicating the highest 
perceived corruption among the countries of this sample.
     
6.1.6 Singapore
     
Republic of Singapore is an ex-colony of United Kingdom, which was an important 
commercial and military center of the British Empire. In 1963 it united with Malaya, 
Sabah and Sarawak to form Malaysia but after 2 years splitted from the Malaysia and 
became independent. State-assisted industrialisation and the attracting of FDI were 
the two key factors in the transitory stage which led to a highly developed market 
based economy relying on electronics, manufacturing, petrochemicals and financial 
services. Singapore is one of the four Asian Tigers as world’s 17th richest country in 
terms of GDP per capita. Furthermore, Singapore is the world’s 4th largest foreign 
exchange trading center and rated as the most business friendly economy with 
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thousands of multinational corporations. After Asian crisis, Singapore took its part in 
the global recession in 2001, but thereafter it covered up soon. Manufacturing 
constitutes 26% of GDP as of 2005. Singapore is ranking as 4th out of 180 countries 
jointly with Sweden in the CPI as of 2007, indicating the lowest perceived corruption 
among the countries of this sample.
6.1.7 South Korea
Before the transitory stage, between 1910 and 1953 South Korea struggled with the 
casualties of the Japanese control and the Korean War. The modern republic was 
established in 1948. Transition through development began with the government’s 
five-year plans which were interrupted several times through constitutional changes 
and undemocratic presidential elections. At the beginning of 1950s it was one of the 
poorest countries in Asia. South Korea entered the growth-path in 1960s and 
exhibited a sustained over-the-average GDP growth by giving weight to capital 
intensive industry. This transition process was weighted on the supporting of the 
large firms and the family-controlled Chaebols through easy access to external 
capital (also state-subsidies) and low corporate taxation. Thereafter, accelerated by 
the alignment with Japan in specific sectors, it became the 3rd largest economy in 
Asia and 11th largest in the world. As one of the four Asian Tigers, Korea is a high-
income nation with high-tech intensive industrial sector. Recently, It is the leading 
country in fields of electronics, computers and digital displays which are produced by 
stock exchange-listed Chaebol-members (ex: Samsung, LG etc.). Moreover, Korea is 
the 3rd largest steel manufacturer, 5th largest automobile and 1st largest ship producer 
of the world. Asian Crisis in 1998 and the collapse of Daewoo (as one of the huge 
bankruptcies in the world) gave a start to the governmental and structural reforms 
concerning the changes in the corporate structure, the discipline in the financial 
sector and the control on the debt-equity ratios of companies. These improvements 
reduced the number of Chaebols by nearly 50% and slowed down the GDP growth to 
4% per year as of 2003 and 2005. By getting used to have surplus in exports, Korea 
follows a moderate inflation with low unemployment. Korea is ranking as 43rd out of 
180 countries jointly with Malaysia in the CPI as of 2007, indicating the 4th lowest 
perceived corruption among the countries of this sample. 
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6.1.8 Taiwan
Taiwan as the Taiwan Province of the Republic of China was under Japanese 
Control until the end of World War II. Thereafter Taiwan suffered from the military 
administration which allowed for monopolies in many industries and from the party-
state dictatorship until 1987. In the following decades it became more liberalized and 
democratized through several reforms in the fields of money market and law. 
Governmental investments are gradually decreased by privatizations of many large 
state-owned companies. In the past three decades the average GDP growth was 
almost 8%. Taxation and inflation are low in Taiwan. 78% of the contribution to GDP 
is coming from the service sector. On the path of development, labour-abundant 
industries were replaced with the capital-abundant high-tech industries. It has 
suffered not much from the Asian Crisis as a cause of the success in the regulatory 
system. As one of the four Asian Tigers and the 17th largest economy in the world, 
Taiwan is the world’s largest computer chip and LCD panel manufacturer. As of 2005 
the industrial growth rate was nearly 4%. The country is lack of natural resources and 
as a consequence it depends heavily on foreign trade which transformed the foreign 
exchange reserves of Taiwan to the world’s largest. Government follows a mutual 
way with the private and industry sector by providing assessment and information to 
corporations. State controlled companies contribute to nearly 18% of the industrial 
output and often criticized by the public (57% in 1952). Taiwan is ranking as 34th out 
of 180 countries jointly with United Arab Emirates and Macao in the CPI as of 2007, 
indicating the 3rd lowest perceived corruption among the countries of this sample. 
6.1.9 Thailand
Since the revolution in 1932 Kingdom of Thailand is governed by monarchy. It is the 
only South East Asian country never to have been colonized. Thailand suffered 
mostly from the coup d’états through decades which complicated the stability of 
economy until 1980s. Thailand is also accepted as a NIC and exhibited a 9% 
average GDP growth between years 1985 and 1996. After 2000 it has found a path 
of GDP growth with 5-7% on average. Thailand is the world’s largest rice supplier. 
Construction, agriculture, Industry and services contribute to GDP with 7%, 13%, 
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32% and 48% respectively. After the crisis in 1997 Thailand received financial aid
from IMF and from other foreign financial institutions to cover its losses. Recently, 
electronic and computer related products are the leading exports of the country. 
Despite improvements in economy and law, Thailand continues to suffer from political 
instability and instable prices. Poverty is decreasing with an annual change of 2%. 
There have been improvements in the financial and banking sector. Thailand is 
ranking as 84th out of 180 countries in the CPI as of 2007, indicating the 2nd highest 
perceived corruption ahead of Indonesia among the countries of this sample. 
6.1.10 Turkey
Republic of Turkey started with its transition stage after the World War I. Lying on a 
strategic and geopolitical location for trade and defence between two continents was 
an easy access for its integration with west by improving the international relations 
with the east. Dominancy of the state-control on private sector, regular military 
takeovers almost after every 10 years and several alterations in organic law 
complicated the sustainability of growth and the stability of the governance. In 1980s 
Turkey exercised a series of reforms to shift the economy from stability to a more 
private sector-intensive market-based economy. These improvements led to faster 
GDP growth until the successive financial crisis occurred in 1994, 1999 and 2001 
respectively which were the result of missing additional reforms, poor banking 
system, large public sector, increased corruption in levels of bureaucracy and two-
digit inflation policy. Turkey exhibited an average annual GDP growth rate of 4% 
between 1981 and 2003. After 2001 Turkey received aid from World Bank and IMF 
targeting to recover the losses. Through additional reforms in financial markets and 
privatizations, Turkey became gradually an attractive location for FDI by maintaining 
the inflation and unemployment in single-digit levels, continuing to reduce the state-
control as on private-sector. Also a shift from agriculture- to capital- intensive industry 
and to service sector boosted the sustainability in growth. The GDP growth in 2005 
was 7.4% making Turkey one of the fastest growing economies. Agriculture 
contributes to GDP by 11.9%, industry by 23.7% and service sector by 64.5%. Key 
determinants of the economy are tourism, construction, automobile manufacturing 
and textiles. Income inequality is severe with 46% of disposable income earned by 
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the 20% of income groups (as of 2004). Turkey’s EU-Accession-Program accelerated 
the improvements in a short time, targeting the sustained growth, structural changes 
in banking, private and public sector. Turkey is ranking as 64th out of 180 countries in 
the CPI as of 2007, indicating a near-the-median perceived corruption among the 
countries of this sample. 
6.2 Summary Statistics
6.2.1 Introduction
In each country, there are a different number of listed firms available for estimation. 
Without regarding the missing values, the largest sub-sample belongs to Malaysia 
with almost 25% and the smallest to Turkey with 2.2% of the total observations 
(43038) (Figure 6.1).57 There is an interesting similarity among the countries of the 
sample; maximum values of I, TQ and CF are in the industry field of Health Service 
(light industry) for India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
The minimum values of those variables are in the field of mining (heavy industry) and 
also same for those countries. Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan exhibit the largest 
values in the field of service industry whereas the minimum values of I, TQ and CF
belong to the heavy industry sectors for all countries except for Taiwan and Turkey.58
Note that there are several definitions on the difference between heavy-and light 
industry. I prefer to follow the definition that heavy industries produce outputs for 
other industries instead of end users, whereas light industries are related to last 
stage of production.59 Table 6.1 summarizes the descriptive values related to the 
variables and interaction variables after controlling for the outliers and missing 
values. 
                                                
57 See Figure 5.1
58 See Table 5.2.
59 Morris Teubal, Heavy and Light Industry in Economic Development The American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 4. (Sep., 1973), pp. 588-596;
Vocabulary of Geography, IV, British Association Glossary Committee, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 118, No. 3. (Sep., 1952), pp. 345-346.
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Figure 6.1: Total observations by Country
6.2.2 Tobin’s Q (TQ)
Mean value of TQ is the highest for Turkey indicating a higher valuation perceived by
the market to firms or a better firm performance relative to that of other countries on 
average. Mean value of TQ is second highest for India and Taiwan and the lowest for 
Philippines. Note that the standard deviation of TQ is high for all countries but almost 
with the same ratio. The difference between mean and median values is on average
low and similar for all countries. Except Korea and Philippines, all countries have 
average TQ close to sample mean and greater than 1. Therefore, if TQ would be an 
efficient measure of firm’s performance, than one can state that the firms of this 
sample are performing well on average.
6.2.3 Cash Flows (CF) 
The mean value of CF is the lowest for Philippines with a magnitude of one-third of 
the sample mean. This should imply that firms in Philippines cannot meet the amount 
of cash flows-required on average, given the firms’ size. Highest average CF-ratio 
belongs to Turkey (almost 3 times larger than the sample mean) and thereafter to 
India and Taiwan. Besides, there is no large dispersion in the mean of CF for the 
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other countries (all greater than 1 except for Philippines). Again, the standard 
deviations are large but in the similar ratio for all countries except Turkey and India.
6.2.4 Investment (I)
Mean values of I is the largest for Turkey, and Korea which are almost one-and half 
times larger than the sample mean and that of other countries. Standard deviation of 
I for India and Malaysia are still relatively high due to large investments which are 
well dispersed from the mean value of I. However, there is no need to make further 
eliminations to prevent the information loss. Maximum investments undertaken by 
firms for each country are represented in Table 6.2. As already mentioned, there are 
similarities in industry fields among countries, where the maximum investment is 
undertaken. It seems that the most profitable (levered) investments are (with respect 
to CF and TQ) in the field of service-intensive light industry for all countries. The 
reason behind this could be the higher cost of heavy industry investments or the 
inflation-level or the increasing demand to those light industry sectors promising large 
positive cash flow streams etc, especially for Philippines, India and Indonesia which 
exhibit relatively lower GDP per capita than that of other countries. Also, an 
alternative reason could be the global slowdown in fix heavy investment projects in 
the countries which are converging to the last stage of the heavy industrial 
development such as Korea and Thailand. 
7. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Introduction
I introduce the Least Squares Estimation (LS) with and without interaction variables, 
respectively. I worked with STATA 9.0 - statistical package for this study. As already 
mentioned, some outliers with extreme values are dropped from the estimations for 
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more consistent results.60 All countries are analyzed within the same regression 
model with industry- and time specific dummies, CF and TQ as explanatory variables
and dummy-interacted variables (CF and TQ with Legal Origin, CPI and ownership 
structure). Using a pooled investment equation with categorical variables should 
capture the effects on I-CFS in a more descriptive way than that of running separate 
regression models for each country. Note that, R²-values and standard deviations are 
moderate ( ² .10R  ) for each regression shown by Table 7.1.
7.2 Interpretation of the Estimation Results
7.2.1 Pooled Sample without the interaction variables
Firstly, I refer to the regression results without any interaction variables (indicators) 
and then to those with interaction variables.  Table 7.1 shows the estimation results
for all cases. F-test on the pooled sample regression confirmed the joint significance 
of the variables after controlling for outliers and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients 
on CF and TQ ( 14.23CFt  , 12.65TQt  ) are highly significant and positive for the 
whole sample. The partial effect of CF on I (


I
CF
) is 0.041. This result states that a 1 
dollar increase in CF contributes to 4.1 cents increase in I. The I-CFS without any 
interaction term is positive for the whole sample. The partial effect of TQ on I (


I
TQ
) 
is 0.034 in which a dollar increase in TQ is related to 3.4 cents increase in I.
7.2.2 Pooled sample with Legal Origin
The Legal Origin-dummy takes the value 1, if the country is of English Legal Origin. 
Results are shown in Table 7.1. The subtractions in the brackets represent the 
difference between the slopes of the variable and the interacted variable ( j j  ). 
                                                
60 it
I
 >2 (which affect the mean values largely) are dropped from the regression equation.
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The industrial dummies (intercepts) are statistically significant at conventional levels, 
only for those industrial fields which are shown in Table 7.2 for all categories. The 
coefficients on TQ and CF are highly significant ( 5.40CFt  , 7.44TQt  ) and positive 
at 1%-Level. I-CFS is smaller (by 56.5%) for Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand (with English Common Law). Similarly, the coefficient on TQ is smaller 
(by 54.5%) for those countries.
7.2.3 Pooled sample with Corruption Level (CPI)
The CPI-dummy takes the value 1, if the country has a CPI greater than or equal to 1 
(low corruption). The coefficients on TQ and CF are highly significant 
( 6.91CFt  , 6.96TQt  ) and positive at 1%-Level. I-CFS is smaller (by 62.1%) for 
Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan (countries of lower perceived 
corruption). Similarly, the coefficient on TQ is smaller (by 51.7%) for those countries. 
7.2.4 Pooled sample with Ownership Structure
I run separate regressions for each ownership category. Ownership-dummy takes the 
value 1 for each of the ownership identities. Ownership structure brought no 
desirable result for a comparison. The coefficient on CF for family and dispersedly 
owned firms is insignificant and positive whereas that of firms of other types of 
ownership structure is positive and significant at 5%-Level. If the coefficient on CF
were significant for family-or dispersed ownership, it would have been the case that 
those firms exhibit slightly higher I-CFS than that of other types of ownership and 
therefore the last prediction could have been (slightly) satisfied.  
7.3 Conclusions
As already mentioned, if the Modigliani-Miller Theory holds, than firm’s market value 
must be must be independent of its capital structure. More precisely, if there is a 
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perfect information and the financial markets are efficient, than firm’s investment 
decisions should not rely on the availability of the internal funds. In the opposite case 
the problem of AI and/or MD arise. What MMT implies; If all the taken actions of the 
regulator are for the efficiency and improvement of the market conditions and 
business relations, than AI and MD should relatively diminish. More clearly, 1  should 
diverge to zero. 
In the absence MMT where there is no perfect information and the market is 
imperfect than one must consider the existence of AI and/or MD-problems. Hence, 
the results confirmed the existence of these problems ( 1 0  ) but they did not give 
any significant explanation about the levels which was the first problem in this study. 
The reason is quite clear that TQ is on average greater than 1 for the pooled sample 
and differs not much across countries, thus it has no obvious explanation on the AI-
and/o MD-levels. 
The second problem is that, the estimations provided no significant explanation for 
the ownership structure which was my last and the unique prediction on the internal 
effects. 
My predictions about the Legal Origin and Corruption Level as external effects found 
support from the estimation results. I have two comments on those results; Firstly, 
the English Common Law is likely to have superior advantages against German or 
French Civil Law systems especially in commercial sector, on the levels of 
shareholders, firms and creditors which could be the reason that firms rely less on 
their internal funds or be less constrained from the external capital market for 
investing activities. Secondly, the corruption level deepens the market imperfection 
and also it might boost the level of asymmetry (adverse selection) indirectly, by 
hardening the external capital constraints of the subjected firms (especially of the 
foreign competitors). Note that, I assumed that CPI reflects the true values of the 
corruption levels (or the true ranking). Thus those firms in countries of higher 
perceived corruption exhibit higher I-CFS than that of firms (even in the same 
industrial field) in countries of lower perceived corruption. 
59         
60         
Table 6.2: Maximum Investment, Cash Flow Ratio and Tobin’s q with respect to SICs (Standard Industrial Classification).
HGK IND IDN KOR SGP MYS PHL TWN THA TUR
Max [I]
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Miscellaneous 
Retail
Min [I] Mining Mining Mining Construction Mining Mining Mining
Manufacturing
(Petroleum) Mining
Manufacturing
(Food)
Max [
CF
K
]
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Miscellaneous 
Retail
Min [
CF
K
]
Mining Mining Mining Construction Mining Mining Mining Manufacturing
(Petroleum)
Mining Manufacturing
(Food)
Max [TQ]
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Health 
Services
Amusement 
And 
Recreation 
Services
Health 
Services
Miscellaneous 
Retail
Min [TQ] Mining Mining Mining Construction Mining Mining Mining
Manufacturing
(Petroleum) Mining
Manufacturing
(Food)
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Dependent
Variable: 
Investment 
(I)
Without 
Interaction 
Variables
Legal Origin
1 if English
Corruption Level Low
(CPI<4)
Largest Owner
Family or Dispersed
Largest Owner
Fin. or Corp.
CF 1

(St. Dev)
.0414416***
(.0029126)
[.082831 -.0468336]***
(.0086789)
[.0821147 -.0510055]***
(.0073818)
[.0398922 + .010613]
(.0083047)
[.0379579 + .013958]**
(.0064367)
TQ
2
(St. Dev)
.0341743***
(.0027018)
[.068849 -.0375158]***
(.0050431)
[.0430671 - .0222707]***
(.003486)
[.0356066 - .009588]**
(.0045657)
[.0378943 -.0131416]***
.0035558)
Percent 
Change 1 1 
- 56,5 % -62,1 % + 26,6 % + 36,8 %
Percent 
Change 2 2 
- 54,5 % - 51,7 % -26,9 % - 34,7 %
#Obs. 9939 9939 9939 9939 9939
R² 0.1008 0.1107 0.1131 0.1013 0.1022
Prob.>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 7.1 Estimation Results (OLS)
The subtractions in the brackets represent the difference of the slopes by using the interaction terms, 
( ) j j-  to capture the effect of 
each category on the explanatory variables. Statistical Significance (t-statistics): *=10 %-, **=5 %-, ***=1 %- Level.
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Dependent Variable:
Investment (I)
Average Changes in investment (Percentage) with respect to Categories and Industrial Fields
Industrial Field Legal Origin
1 if English
Corruption Level Low
(CPI<4)
Largest Owner
Family or Dispersed
Largest Owner
Fin. or Corp.
Plastic Foam Products +9.33% *** +8.71%** +7.79%** +8.37%**
Special Industry Machinery +9.85% ** +8.98%*** +7.77%** +8.42%**
Motor Vehicles and Motor 
Vehicle Equipment
+6.32% * (-) (-) (-)
Retail Trade +6.25% * +6.16%* (-) (-)
Telephone Communications 
except
Radio Telephone
+11.91%*** +12.09%* +10.25%*** +11.5%***
Electronic and Other 
Electrical Equipment and 
Components except 
Computers
+11.13%*** +10.75%*** +8.97%*** +9.5%***
Local and Suburban Transit 
and Interurban Highway 
Transportation
+5.811% * 5.83%* (-) (-)
Table 7.2: Average Changes in investment (Percentage) with respect to Categories (as intercept i ) and Industrial Fields.
Statistical Significance:*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%-Level, (-) =not significant at conventional levels.
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8. APPENDIX
1. AI, MD and optimal investment
Interpretation:
The point where the cost of capital equals to the marginal returns on investment 
represents the equilibrium. On this point the firm can meet the investment costs with 
its returns from investment without relying on any internal fund. According to the 
assumptions of AI-Theory, firm is not able to pay any dividend to shareholders and 
the marginal returns on investment exceed the cost of capital i which cannot be 
monitored by the external financing sources. Thus firm must use its cash flows to 
finance investment and move to the optimal investment equilibrium where the 
marginal cost and returns are equal. For MD to occur firm must have marginal 
returns on investment smaller than the marginal cost of capital. Additionally, there is 
an excess of cash flows which can be paid as a dividend to shareholders. Thus a 
growth maximizing manager can pursue his/her own goal by moving to the optimal 
investment level where cost of capital equals the marginal return on investment 
rather than paying dividends to shareholders. 
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2. Calculating Tobin’s Q: 
     
      jK   : Capital Stock of the firm j.
jV : Market Value of the firm j.
ar    : Average return on total (assets) capital
            j  : Profits   j = a jr K  (average return on total assets capital stock)
i     : Discount Rate (Cost of capital)
jq    : 
Market Value of the firm
Capital Stock of the firm
      Value of the firm changes with respect to the discount rate,
     
,
,
V j i
V jq j K j
r Kaj j
ri i aq j iK Kj j



 
 
 
    
   
Substitution leads to the ratio of the return on total assets to the cost of capital.
3. Market Capitalization / GDP- ratio by Country between 2000-2004
Year
Hong 
Kong
India Indonesia Korea, 
Rep.
Singapore Phil. Malaysia Taiwan Thailand Turkey
2000
369 32 16 34 165 34 129 81 24 35
2001
304 23 14 46 137 58 136 103 31 32
2002
283 26 15 46 116 51 130 89 36 18
2003
451 46 23 54 248 30 162 124 85 28
2004
519 56 29 63 258 33 152 129 72 32
Table A-1
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4. Corruption Perception Index 2000-2004
Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
H. Kong 7.7 7.9 8.2 8 8
India 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8
Indonesia 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2
Korea 4 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.5
Malay. 4.8 5 4.9 5.2 5
Phlippines 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.6
Singapore 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.3
Taiwan 5.5 5.9 5.6 5.7 5.6
Thailand 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.6
Turkey 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.2
Table A-3
Source: Transparency International, Berlin; www.transparency.org.
5. MODIGLIANI-MILLER THEORY
Assumptions:
I. N Homogeneous firms in sets of indebted and all-equity firms (expected 
returns on equity vary across firms with respect to risk of investment projects.)
II. Perfect Capital Market,
III. Lending and borrowing rates of debt are equal,
IV. Neutral Taxes ( 0  ),
V. No transaction costs,
VI. Debt and Equity are perfect substitutes61,
VII. Law of one Price: Due to arbitrage and simultaneous transactions of the 
agents the equilibrium is maintained at same time,
                                                
61 This assumption relaxes the problem of investment-funding and assumes that there is no information asymmetry and the markets are efficient for substituting these assets 
as risk-free in well diversified derivative markets. See Modigliani and  Miller (1958).
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The Model with two Firms (without taxes, 0  ):
jp : Price of the stock,
jx :  The expected return on equity,
jx :  Average return on equity,
k :  Required rate of return on equity, where k represents the class of firms   
according to their risk-class. 
jV :  Value of firm j, where j = 1, 2
kd :  Required rate of return on debt (cost of debt),
j :  expected return on a share.
j
j
D
E
:  Debt-Equity ratio of the firm.
       
Propositions62:
Proposition 1
For any firm;                                     jV  jD + jE = j
k
x
 ,
That is the market value of the firm is the sum of its total debt and equity or simply 
the average return on equity divided by the required return on the equity. This leads 
to;
j
k
j
x
V

Average return on equity can be considered as the average cost of capital where no 
taxes and market imperfection exist. Than this equation simply implies that the 
average cost of capital is independent from its capital structure (from how it is 
financed) but dependent with the risk measured by k (set of firms due to risk level). 
                                                
62 I explain only the propositions which are mostly related to my thesis therefore I exclude the one considering the taxes. 
      For more details please see Modigliani and Miller (1958)  and Miller and Modigliani (1963)
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This equation also represents the capitalisation rate where the average return on 
equity (cash flows) is divided by the market value. More simply this ratio indicates 
how rapid the investment covers its cost through cash flow streams.
Proposition 2:
j  =  k + ( k -  jd ) j
j
D
E
That is the expected return on firm’s share is equal to the capitalization rate plus the 
spread between the capitalization rate and the cost of debt (return of “to be 
indebted”) times the debt-equity ratio (leverage). Assume that  j  is 1, that is the 
return on shares is one unit, than;
 1
1
j j
k k k k k k
j j
j j j j
k k k
j j j
j j
k k
j j j
k j k j k j
k
j j j
k
j
j k j j
k
D D
d d
E E
D D D E
d
E E E
D E
d
E D E
d D d D d D
D E V x
x
x d D D
d
   
 



 
         
                            
  
        
    

  
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Equity is eliminated from the equation.
Therefore the cost of capital (return on equity) is a linear function of the debt-equity 
ratio. The higher the j
j
D
E
, the higher the return on equity, as a consequence of risk 
sheltered by owning the equity through using debt. Moreover j
k
x
d
 represents the ratio 
of return on equity to cost of debt and hence the recovery rate of investment in 
paying back the debt. Thus if j =1, than as jD  increases jx  must also increase at 
the same proportion by holding the cost of debt as given.
Proposition 3:
Let * the rate of return on the investment and suppose that firm in the set of k  
borrows I amount of fund for this investment project.
I have already                    jV  jD + jE = j
k
x
     and
 
 
* *
,
*
*
*
j
i j
k k
i i i j j
k
i j j
k
i j
k
x I I
V V
I
E V D V D I
I
E V D
I
E E I
 
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





  
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   
  
Thus the resulting equation has no interpretation on how the investment is financed 
or if it is profitable to undertake such an investment. So according to the theory, by 
assuming that the managers try to maximize the shareholder wealth, a manager will 
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only undertake such an investment if the   *  is equal to or larger than k  regardless 
of the source of financing..
5.1 The Intuition behind the Modigliani-Miller Theory:
Theory states that if the conditions (the aforementioned assumptions) are met, than 
one must think of other variables rather than the market value or the internal funds 
which can have impact on the firm’s capital structure or on its investment decisions. 
The theory assumes that there is a perfect information and a perfect market (no sign 
of AI). On the other hand managers maximize the shareholders’ wealth (no sign of 
MD) rather than undertaking investments with negative NPV. Therefore these all 
imply straightforward that the improvements in markets and legal systems converging 
to the theory’s assumptions lead to a decrease in MD and AI level which constructs 
the logic behind my thesis. 
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